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Saudi Arabia’s “Founding Day” signifies a radical break with the Wahhabi political influence that had legitimized the Saudi political projects since 1744.

Analysis Politics and Governance Saudi Arabia Feb 23, 2022 The Saudi “Founding Day” and the Death of Wahhabism Saudi Arabia’s “Founding Day” signifies a radical break with the Wahhabi political influence that had legitimized the Saudi political projects since 1744. Sultan Alamer 15 min read Saudis gather during the country's first Founding Day celebrations in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, February 22. (REUTERS/Ahmed Yosri) On January 27, King Salman bin Abdulaziz issued a royal decree designating February 22 as a national holiday called the “Founding Day.” This day commemorates “the beginning of the reign of Imam Mohammed ibn Saud and his foundation of the first Saudi state,” which took place, according to the decree, in February 1727. A few days after the announcement, a logo for the event was launched with the slogan “The Day We Started.” At the center is a man carrying a banner surrounded by four symbols. The first is the symbol of dates, which signifies life, growth, and generosity. The second is a symbol of a majlis council, which signifies unity as well as social and cultural harmony. The third, an Arabian horse, is a symbol of the chivalry and bravery shown by the state’s princes and heroes. The last symbol is for a market, which signifies economic activity, openness, and diversity. “Founding Day” logo The event has substantial political significance as it signifies a radical break with the Wahhabi political influence that had legitimized the Saudi political projects since 1744. This can be discerned from the logo itself. Whereas the Islamic Shahadah phrase, “There is no deity but God, and Muhammed is the messenger of God,” is inscribed on the Saudi national flag, the banner in the middle of the logo is surprisingly blank. Moreover, while the symbols refer to history, culture, economy, and life – religion is strikingly left without a symbol. But the bluntest move that indicates the break with the powerful Wahhabi political narrative, or myth, that previously twinned with the story of the Al Sauds was the selection of the beginning of the reign of Mohammed ibn Saud, the great ancestor of the Al Saud dynasty, as the foundational moment of the first Saudi state. Selecting 1727 instead of 1744 as the country’s founding year does not only signify a break with the Wahhabi political myth but also reveals the founding of a new political myth. The Saudi State and the Wahhabi Political Myth Political myths refer to narratives that are constructed and promoted by the political leadership to legitimize either the political entity or its policies. Both myths and histories are the products of engagement with the past. However, they differ in that history aims to understand the past as accurately as possible whereas political myths serve political needs in the present. Calling them “myths” does not mean that they are necessarily fiction or fake. Most of the time, political myths contain elements of historical fact but are presented in a highly selective manner. The Wahhabi political myth refers to the narrative that the first Saudi state was born out of a covenant made between Muhammed ibn Abdul-Wahhab and Mohammed ibn Saud in 1744. The story often starts with a biography of Muhammed ibn Abdul-Wahhab. It presents him as a religious reformer and his teachings as simply an attempt to restore Islam to the form it was during the Prophet Muhammad’s time. He went to several towns in eastern and central Arabia in search of political protection and support. After several futile attempts, he decided in 1744 to travel to Diriyah, which was then ruled by Mohammed ibn Saud. Upon their meeting, the two made the covenant wherein Mohammed ibn Saud would help Muhammed ibn Abdul-Wahhab to spread his religious teachings, and, in return, the religious reformer would not leave him for his political rivals. This political myth legitimizes the Saudi state by presenting it as an indispensable tool to apply, spread, and protect Wahhabi Islam. Although theoretically it puts the Saudi project in a subservient position in relation to the Wahhabi mission, it gives the state a divine mandate, while it also frees it from the historical responsibilities resulting from the agreements that the Saudi leadership made with different local elites during the state-formation period in the early 20th century. It also provides the state with a powerful theoretical arsenal to resist calls for power sharing and democratization. Historically, it gave King Abdulaziz al-Saud, the founder of contemporary Saudi Arabia, a competitive advantage against his rivals during the Saudi unification process. These rivals either belonged to powerful tribes, such as the Rashidis in Hail, or were descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, such as the Sharifs in the Hijaz. Lacking both, King Abdulaziz legitimized his rule by presenting it as a political project in the service of Wahhabism, which he considered the purest form of Islam. In a speech in the newly incorporated Hijaz in 1929, Ki...

The Saudi “Founding Day” and the Death of Wahhabism - AGSI