As Israel intensifies its attacks in Lebanon, the prospect of the “great war” looms.
As Israel’s war of annihilation in Gaza enters its fourth month, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appears intent on pulling the U.S. deeper into a wider regional war. In recent weeks, Israel has intensified its military operations inside Lebanon, killing several mid-level Hezbollah commanders in what appear to be targeted assassination strikes. Israel is also widely believed to have been responsible for the January 2 drone strike in a Beirut suburb that killed a senior Hamas official, Saleh al-Arouri. Hezbollah, a well-armed and organized Lebanese resistance movement with close links to Iran and a central member in the axis of resistance, has regularly fired rockets into northern Israel and has conducted drone strikes of its own, including against a strategic Israeli military facility. This week’s guests on Intercepted are Amal Saad, a lecturer in politics at Cardiff University and a scholar of Hezbollah, and Karim Makdisi, an associate professor of international politics at the American University of Beirut. They join Jeremy Scahill and Murtaza Hussain for an in-depth discussion on whether Israel’s war on Gaza will spark what many in the region believe is an inevitable “great war” against Israel. They also discuss the role of Iran and its relationships with Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as how Joe Biden compares to past presidents on the wars in Palestine and Lebanon. Jeremy Scahill: This is Intercepted. Welcome to Intercepted. I’m Jeremy Scahill. Murtaza Hussain: And I’m Murtaza Hussain. JS: Maz, there is a lot to talk about this week, especially what appears to be the expansion of Israel’s war against Gaza now into a broader war. There have been concerns from the beginning that part of Israel’s strategy in the way that it’s been conducting its scorched earth campaign against Gaza, and the rhetoric that it’s using comparing Hamas to ISIS, and appealing to the United States to view this as the U.S. war, not just Israel’s war, is that the ultimate target of it would be to force the United States or get the United States engaged in an open war against Iran. And what we’ve seen happen is what’s called the axis of resistance, which involves the Houthis in Yemen, the Islamic resistance in Iraq, Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas. We are now starting to see this network, this coalition, become much more bold and defiant toward Israel and, also, the United States. But what we’re also seeing is increased military activity on the part of the Israelis against Hezbollah in Lebanon and, also, Israeli officials talking, openly saying that they don’t necessarily want a wider war against Hezbollah and its allies, but that it’s certainly on the table. And, of course, a couple of weeks ago, or within the last two weeks, we saw the assassination in a suburb of Beirut of Saleh al-Arouri, who was a top Hamas leader, and one of the main liaisons between Hamas and Hezbollah, an individual who had also been involved with the negotiations around the exchange of hostages and prisoners between Hamas and Israel. Now, Israel hasn’t taken responsibility officially for that attack, but it’s widely believed that Israel conducted that strike in Beirut, a very, very significant attack inside of Lebanon, because Hassan Nasrallah — the head of Hezbollah, which is a very powerful resistance movement with sophisticated military capability — has indicated that Hezbollah is not going to tolerate Israel doing those kinds of strikes. We also this week saw a couple more Israeli drone strikes, including strikes that Israel did, in fact, take responsibility for, one of which killed a fairly senior member of Hezbollah as well. You also have had Hezbollah launching regular missile barrages into northern Israel. And, in fact, one of the operations that Hezbollah did, did significant damage — in the assessment, even, of the Israeli government — to a key military installation that Israel has right near the border with Lebanon. So, a lot to talk about, about all of this. We’re going to have two great guests coming up soon on the show, Maz. MH: Yeah. The situation is developing day by day. There were reports that Hezbollah had also retaliated by attacking another Israeli military base in retaliation for the assassination of one of their commanders in Lebanon earlier this week. It’s clear that every single day the escalation cycle is continuing, and I think it’s very clear from the Israeli perspective that they seem to have a window in their view to bring the United States in as a belligerent in this conflict. Obviously, the U.S. is trying to pivot away from the region, it’s drawn down its forces significantly after two decades of very unhappy wars in the Middle East. Yet, Israel still has very serious security challenges — has rivalries, mostly with this network of Iranian-patronized groups in different countries surrounding its borders. And, as long as that exists, it’s still going to need the U.S. to have a very, very strong military footprint. And, if a major war begins now on the back of the conflict in Gaza that expands to Lebanon or Syria or other countries besides, the U.S. still has significant military assets in place, which could very, very likely be drawn into the conflict. And, as most people know, it’s pretty much blamed — this war in Gaza — very much so on the U.S., which is providing critical arms and political support to Israel. So, from Israel’s perspective, this could be a final opportunity to have the U.S. weigh in, fighting Hezbollah and Iran directly. Without that support, Israel has very, very unclear chances of emerging decisively victorious in such a conflict. JS: Yeah. And Antony Blinken — the U.S. Secretary of State — has been in the region again on Tuesday, he was in Israel. And Blinken continues to put on this kind of propaganda show, where the Biden administration talks about its serious concern for the fate of the Palestinian people in Gaza, and yet continues to keep this pipeline of weaponry open to Israel. It’s really clear — and you could actually read this in the Israeli press as well — that if the Biden administration wanted to cut this off and shut it down, it could do it instantly. If Biden said the weapons shipments are going to stop, this is over. And it’s quite fascinating to watch how U.S. diplomats keep getting played, whether it’s Jake Sullivan, the national security advisor, or Antony Blinken, who’s there. The Israelis will say one thing to the Americans, and one thing to the American press; oh, Israel is shifting now into a different phase of this war, they’re going to go more into a U.S.-style targeted assassination campaign, like was run under Barack Obama when the drone program really got put on steroids and the U.S. started whacking people in these so-called “targeted operations.” But then, to the Israeli domestic public, they’re giving a different message, which is that the war against Hamas is continuing, that this is going to go on for quite a long time. And I think what’s really interesting about Blinken’s visit is, he arrives in Tel Aviv, and he then is subjected to a lecture, basically, by Israeli officials denouncing South Africa’s attempt to bring— Or, not attempt, but South Africa is bringing Israel before the International Court of Justice on genocide charges. Those arguments are going to begin on Thursday of this week, and South Africa is going to be presenting a case, that is basically saying that Israel has failed to prevent genocide in Gaza, and seeking the court to essentially assert its jurisdiction. Now, Israel and the United States both don’t care much about international law as it applies to their operations. But this is going to be a quite significant public moment, because South Africa is going to make a case that is going to seek to highlight the statements of Israeli officials that are genocidal, clearly, in nature, and the actions of Israel. And then Israel is going to present its initial defense, and Israeli officials told Antony Blinken that they’re looking forward to presenting their self-defense case at the International Court of Justice. MH: Yeah, it’s fascinating. The way Benjamin Netanyahu talks to U.S. officials, or rebuts their statements and his own public statements is almost comical. It’s kind of bullying, in some ways, U.S. officials. And, as much as people talk about, well, Iran has all these proxies in the region, which are fighting for it and so forth, Israel sometimes seems to treat U.S. administrations like its own proxy, especially Netanyahu, and the way he sort of intervenes or talks down to U.S. officials when they come to visit him. And I think this court case is something which is very alarming, even though, as you mentioned correctly, Israel and the U.S. tend to ignore as much as possible any dictates of international law in their own operations. From Israel’s perspective, it’s another step on the path of becoming a pariah, or a pariah which is only reliant on one country as its shield — which is the United States — and how long that situation can be maintained, as you see this steady accumulation of legal and political precedents which are focused on isolating Israel more and more. It’s very, very unclear, and I think it makes more and more impetus for Israel to intervene as much as it can in American politics, to maintain that defense there. Because, without that, it would be standing very, very much alone, and this ICJ case is only more symbolism of that. JS: As we now move toward the program and bring our guests in, it’s really vital to remember the horrifying death toll that continues to rise in Gaza. So many children have been killed or maimed. The images that we see are just utterly gut-wrenching. You have now almost no functioning medical facilities left in Gaza. The World Health Organization and other groups are just saying that the situation is beyond dire, and so many people around the world now calling for a ceasefire. And it should shock everyone’s soul that this has gone on now for more than three months, and the entire thing is being supported by the most powerful political figure in the world: Joe Biden, the President of the United States. So, joining us now are Amal Saad. She is lecturer in politics at Cardiff University, a scholar of Hezbollah, and the politics of the resistance axis. Also joining us from Beirut is Karim Makdisi, he is associate professor of international politics at the American University of Beirut. Amal, Karim, welcome to Intercepted. Thank you so much for joining us. Amal Saad: Thanks for having me. Karim Makdisi: Thank you very much for having me. JS: Karim, let’s begin with you. First, just in the very big picture, talk about, now, how these events in Gaza, the strikes that Israel has been conducting in Lebanon — not just in areas that are under the control of Hezbollah, but also the recent strike that took place in a suburb of Beirut targeting a senior Hamas official — talk about the latest analysis you can offer on the perspective from Lebanon on Israel’s attacks in both Gaza and, now, increasingly inside of Lebanon. KM: I think the first thing to note is the larger context of Israeli attacks in Lebanon. So, even before we think about these last few weeks, it’s important to realize that, as far as Lebanon is concerned, the Israelis have been attacking and invading for the better part of for decades or so. Including in 1978 and 1982, throughout the 1990s when there was an occupation for over 20 years. And then a very big war in 2006, and then there have been incursions since then; attacks, violations of the airspace, the maritime space. So there’s been a lot of tension over many years, until Lebanon first was liberated in the year 2000 and then, as I said, following the 2006 war with this, there’s been a kind of balance between Hezbollah and Israelis when it comes to South Lebanon. So, with this in mind, I think it’s important just to realize, again, that the idea of the Israelis attacking — inside Beirut, for example, most recently — is something that is a big escalation in Lebanon. It’s something that many people are worried about, they’re worried about the way in which Hezbollah has responded and might respond, given that they certainly have the arsenal to respond in quite an emphatic fashion, if they choose to do so. I think Hezbollah has been very restrained so far. They’ve kept their attacks on military targets. Unlike the Israelis, they’ve kept their attacks largely on military targets within around eight or so kilometers of the north of Israel. I think they, as I said, I think they’ve been quite restrained, and the worry is that with Israel being on the defensive, I think with Israel being unable to achieve its objectives in Gaza, being unable to eliminate Hamas as they kind of declared that they wanted to, to dismantle Hamas, just as they were unable to dismantle Hezbollah in 2006. The track record of the Israelis is that they then tend to escalate, they then tend to push further and further and further, in the hope that Hezbollah then responds, perhaps to civilian targets, or responds in a way that they can then use as another justification or excuse to then deepen their response to Lebanon, and potentially provoke a war. I think this is the thing most of us here are quite worried about, that the Israelis have an incentive at this stage to provoke a regional war, including in Lebanon. In that sense, Hezbollah is being very, very restrained, but it certainly has the capability to respond if it has to. MH: Amal, for our listeners who don’t know, can you tell us a bit about the origins of Hezbollah and its relationship with the Israeli state over the past few decades? Karim mentioned that Israel occupied South Lebanon for many, many years, and Hezbollah emerged out of that context. How does Hezbollah view Israel, and why would a conflict between Hezbollah and Israel be far, far greater in magnitude and scope than the current war, even in Gaza, between Hamas and Israel? AS: OK. So, the first part of your question: Hezbollah owes its existence, really, to Israel’s invasion and occupation of Lebanon in 1982. It started off as an umbrella group of various resistance factions, which then united and formed the Hezbollah organizational nucleus, and it succeeded in expelling Israeli troops from Lebanon unconditionally, actually; it was a unilateral withdrawal in 2000. Now, there remain territories that are occupied by Israel in Lebanon. However, this isn’t the reason, though, that Hezbollah continues to remain armed in its resistance. It’s always been tied, actually, and this has been quite public. In fact, it’s been tied to Israel’s very existence, as Hezbollah officials put it, its very existence as an aggressive, as they call it, usurping entity. And so, they say, so long as Israel exists, this threat will remain to Lebanon. That’s a part of it. The other part is that they will always want to support their Palestinian brothers. And so, that’s another reason why Hezbollah has remained armed since 1982, and has refused any talk of disarmament. I think Hezbollah, and I think the U.S. and Israel are well aware of its military capabilities and how they’ve developed since 2006. Now, in 2006, Hezbollah was already what we would call a hybrid military force, meaning it was no longer just a guerrilla group as it had been in the past. It clearly emerged as sort of in between a conventional armed force and a guerrilla group, and that’s why it was very successful in defeating Israel’s objectives in 2006. Now, since then, as we know, Hezbollah has developed its military capabilities, not only in terms of types of weapons, in terms of the size of its forces, which have grown from 5,000 to over a hundred thousand in terms of rockets, from thousands to over, maybe, 150,000. So, we’re talking about, obviously, in terms of size, in terms of sophistication, and so on. But Hezbollah has also been very battle hardened because of its intervention in Syria. So, all of these factors together, I think, make it now a formidable force. And I would say, at this point, we could classify Hezbollah more along the sort of hybrid spectrum as closer to a conventional armed force than a guerrilla force. I would actually call it a resistance army, if you like. So, I do think we’re talking here about a war, if and when it happens — and I do think it’s inevitable that this war will happen, what they’re calling the “great war,” if you like — is that, while Israel could obviously destroy much of Lebanon, no one doubts this, and kill a very large number of people with its aerial power— What Hezbollah lacks in aerial power it makes up for with military ability, in addition to the fact that, as I said, it has longer-range missiles, more sophisticated weapons than in the past, precision guided missiles. In fact, they used precision guided anti-tank guided missiles, it seems, for the attack on the Meron air intelligence base. So, it definitely does have much more formidable weapons, although it would still be, I would call it an asymmetrical war, in that, obviously, Israel would be much more militarily powerful. Hezbollah could still inflict massive, massive damage on Israel. I think we have to look at these things, not in absolute terms, but in relative terms. Relative to what Israel’s accustomed to, this would be a formidable war, because it’s unprecedented that any war is taken to Israel proper. All wars that have been fought tend to be fought in other countries or territories that Israel has occupied or invaded. And, while in 2006 Hezbollah did launch cross-border strikes with missiles, I’m talking here about, it could strike the heart of Tel Aviv. It could go to the utmost limits in terms of the depth of its incursions, the type of damage it could cause, in terms of striking all types of civilian infrastructure, Hezbollah and Nasrallah himself, Hezbollah’s leader, has threatened this on multiple occasions. So, in terms of quantity, in terms of quality of attacks, we’re looking at something Israel has never experienced in its history. And, because of that, and because it has so much to lose, in a way that, frankly Lebanon doesn’t, because Lebanon has been undergoing a severe economic collapse, doesn’t have the sort of infrastructure that Israel does, doesn’t have the economy that Israel does. So, Israel would lose a lot more economically and in terms of infrastructure than Lebanon would, in fact. JS: Amal, you also have an effort to paint a certain type of picture for your domestic audience, and this is certainly true of the U.S. war in Iraq and Afghanistan, going back to Vietnam, etc., etc. And the Israeli public is largely being shown an IDF or an Israeli government-endorsed version of events on the ground in Gaza, but if you follow all-sides media and all of the images and propaganda being put out, you start to recognize a very different reality on the ground. For instance, Hamas’s military wing, the Qassam Brigades, they’re putting out videos every day showing— And, in fact the little dancing red triangle has become a kind of iconic symbol across social media. For people that aren’t following this, as Hamas has been putting out videos, they will often show multistage perspectives from attacks that they are conducting on Israeli troop formations, on tanks, and they’ll put this little red triangle bouncing above it, and then they’ll show the actual strike against the tank, or the strike against the ground forces. For people who have been following it closely, it’s very clear that the war itself, the military campaign against Hamas — not just talking about the scorched earth bombing of civilians, but the actual military campaign against Hamas in Gaza — is not going the way that Israel is portraying it to the Israeli public. And what you and Karim have both indicated is that Hezbollah is a much more advanced and well-armed entity than Hamas. I’m curious about that aspect of i… truncated (47,879 more characters in archive)
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